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Role of the Religion and Politico-Religious Organizations 





After the division of Vietnam into two hostile states in 1954, religion played an im-
portant role in the southern, pro-western State of Vietnam. In 1954–56 the struggle 
for control over the country by politico-religious organizations, or so called Sects, de-
fined the founding period of South Vietnam. After the victory of government under 
the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem and proclamation of the Republic of Vietnam, the 
rivalry between Catholicism and Buddhism begun to emerge. However, for various 
reasons, it erupted only in year 1963, and was in fact a political struggle between dif-
ferent visions of South Vietnam’s future, and not a Catholic president repressing his 









The Geneva Conference of 1954 divided Vietnam into two hostile countries: 
the northern Democratic Republic of Vietnam, ruled by the Communists, 
and the southern pro-western State of Vietnam. In North Vietnam the ques-
tion of religion quickly became irrelevant, both because of the massive exo-
dus of devout Catholics, and quite typical oppressive policies of the com-
munist state. However, in the South, religion was an important issue in all 
aspects of life of the young state. The problem of rivalry between two great 
religions, Buddhism and Christianity, was not evident in 1954, however it 
was simmering right under the surface, and erupted violently in later years. 
A much more pressing issue was that of politico-religious organizations, so 




called Sects, that had ambitions for country-wide power, and were hostile 
to any tighter control from the state. 
However, before moving into the intricate reality of the forming period 
of South Vietnam, I would like to present a few facts about the main actors, 




Christianity, or more precisely, Catholicism, came to Vietnam with European 
explorers and traders in the 16th century. Vietnam, along with other Asian 
countries, became the object of interest of religious orders, in particular 
Jesuits, who in the next decades dominated missionary activities in Indo-
china. The most prominent member of the Society of Jesus in Vietnam was 
Alexander De Rhodes, who wrote the Dictionarium Annamiticum Lusitanum 
et Latinum, a trilingual Vietnamese-Portuguese-Latin dictionary, and estab-
lished Quoc Ngu, the Vietnamese alphabet that uses Roman characters, which 
eventually became the dominant writing system for Vietnamese. 
The rulers and elites of Vietnam were wary of the new faith, seeing it 
both as a threat to their own position, and as an instrument of unwanted 
European influence. On the other hand, during the 17th and 18th centuries 
Vietnam was divided into two states deeply hostile to each other, ruled by 
the Nguyen and Trinh dynasties, who from time to time sought external sup-
port in their fight, be it the Dutch or the Portuguese. This in turn allowed 
missionary work to continue. 
Catholicism became more widespread at the beginning of the 19th century, 
as a result of the activities of the Bishop of Adran, Pierre Pigneau de Behaine. 
Like many before him, he came to Vietnam as a priest to proselytize. How-
ever, the Frenchman managed to befriend Nguyen Phuc Anh, a prince from 
the Nguyen Dynasty, and became his close advisor. Despite only a token 
support from the French royal court, he was able to recruit a few hundred 
Europeans to support Nguyen Phuc Anh’s bid for power. They built modern 
fortresses and helped reform the army of the Vietnamese ruler, who was 
able to defeat his adversaries and conquer the whole country, proclaiming 
himself emperor in 1802. 
Gia Long, as the new ruler named himself, tolerated the activities of Ro-
man Catholic missionaries, however this was not the case under the rule of 
his successors. It was caused by their belief that Christianity was a danger to 
the state-sponsored Confucianism as a religion, and that it would cause 
strife and division in the society. This view was reinforced by the Catholic 





participation in the failed rebellion against Gia Long’s successor, Minh 
Mang, in year 1833. In addition, the Vietnamese authorities considered the 
constantly increasing number of arriving missionaries agents of influence of 
European countries, especially France. As the result, Minh Mang and his 
successors issued a number of imperial edicts aimed against missionaries. 
Number of them were expelled, and some were executed. Repression also 
fell on local converts. 117 victims of those persecutions were first baptized 
in few batches, to finally be Canonized by Roman Catholic Church in year 
1988 as Vietnam Martyrs. Despite harassment, the religion prevailed in Viet-
nam. 
Situation changed completely after the French conquest of Indochina 
(1862–1896). Christianity quite naturally took a privileged position in the 
colonial period, and the Catholic Church was one of the largest land-owners 
in Indochina. Catholic villages usually cooperated with French more willingly, 
and most colonial troops were recruited from Vietnamese of that faith. 
However, the religion itself did not become synonymous with collaboration, 
thanks to several high-profile cases of patriotic Vietnamese Catholics. One 
of them was the Mandarin Ngo Dinh Kha, who despite his faith reached high 
positions on Emperor’s Thanh Thai’s (1889–1907) court. After the French 
deposed the disobedient ruler and send him into exile, Kha renounced all of 
his official titles and French decorations in protest and moved to the country-
side, becoming a Vietnamese symbol of resistance against colonizers. Around 
the time of Geneva Conference there were around 1,5 million Catholics in 




Buddhism came to Vietnam between the 2–3rd centuries BC from India, via 
South Asia, or between the 1–2nd centuries AD from China, depending on 
the tradition.1 By the 2nd century AD the religion was firmly established in 
the country, with an important regional center of Mahayana Buddhism 
nearby to the present day capital city of Hanoi. It coexisted with Taoism and 
Chinese and Vietnamese folk religions, centered around the cult of ancestors 
and the forces of nature. 
Buddhism grew in importance in Vietnam, first becoming the official 
faith in the 10th century, and then becoming the state religion during the Ly 
dynasty reign in the 11th century. It retained this privileged position until 
14th century when it fell out of favor, and Confucianism took its place among 
                                                 
1 The History of Buddhism in Vietnam, ed. Nguyen Tai Thu, Washington D.C. 2008, p. 13. 




ruling elites. Buddhism, however, retained its popularity among common 
folk, and returned briefly to prominence during the 19th century rule of the 
Nguyen dynasty. 
In the 1920’s the Buddhist Revival (Chan Hung Phat Giao) movement 
emerged in Vietnam, aiming to reform and strengthen the organizational 
structure of the religion, especially in the face of the growing influence of 
hierarchical and well organized Christianity, and the emergence of new 
religions and sects during the French rule. One of the principles propagated 
by the Buddhist Revival movement was the connection between their 
religion and the prosperity of the Vietnamese state. Its leaders believed that 
the golden age of Vietnam between the 10th and 14th centuries was directly 
linked to the devout adherence of royal dynasties to the Buddhist religion, 
and it was the abandonment of this faith that led to a series of unfortunate 
events for the country, such as the invasion of the Chinese Ming dynasty at 
the beginning of the 15th century. According to this narrative, only the 
return of Buddhism to its proper position in the country’s power-structure 
could assure the prosperity of the newly formed South Vietnam.2 However, 
in 1954 Buddhists had no unitary structure, and were divided into many 




Under the French rule there were numerous sects and religions originating 
from Buddhism or folk religion. However, two of them rose to great promi-
nence: Hoa Hao and Cao Dai. Along with the Binh Xuyen organization, they 
were known as politico-religious organizations or Sects, and played an im-
portant role in the birth period of South Vietnam. 
Hoa Hao is a religious tradition that sprouted from Buddhism. It was 
founded by Huynh Phu So, commonly known as Phat Thay (Buddha Master) 
in year 1939. His variant of the religion was aimed at the poor peasants and 
was devoid of complex ceremonies and doctrines. So shunned temples, pre-
ferring to preach on street corners and canal intersections. However, his 
ambitions went beyond religion, and he established the Viet Nam Demo-
cratic Socialist Party in year 1946. This put him at odds with Viet Minh. 
Fearing his nationalistic and socialist credentials, Communists captured and 
killed So in April 1947, chopping his body to deprive his followers of any 
                                                 
2 E. Miller, Missaliance. Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Viet-
nam, Cambridge–London 2013, p. 263. 





relics. After the Hoa Hao leader’s death, the organization became a loose 
network of warlords who decided to join the French in their war against the 
Viet Minh to avenge their leader. 
Cao Dai, or Caodaism (it means “Highest Power” in Vietnamese) is a reli-
gion established in 1926 by Ngo Van Chieu. Officially known as “Great Way 
of the Third Time of Redemption,” it gained over a million members in few 
decades, especially in Cochinchina. It is a syncretic religion, with pantheon 
including Joan of Arc, Muhammad, Moses, Luis Pasteur and Victor Hugo, be-
sides many Southeast Asians. It has a structure based on that of the Roman 
Catholic Church, with a Pope, Cardinals, Bishops, and Priests, and its own 
Holy See in Tay Ninh, ninety kilometers from Saigon. After WW2 and a brief 
period of supporting Viet Minh, Pope Pham Cong Tac decided to ally with 
the French. Cao Dai helped in the fight against the Communists, receiving 
money, arms, and semi-autonomy in large parts of South Vietnam. 
Binh Xuyen did not have a spiritual side – in fact, it was a criminal organ-
ization that came into being as a coalition of river pirates from the Mekong 
Delta. During WW2 they allied themselves first with the Japanese secret 
police Kempeitai, and then the southern branch of Viet Minh. However, the 
leader of the organization, Bay Vien, sensed the shift of power in the South, 
and in the year 1948 he went over to the French side. The price paid by the 
colonizers was not a small one: Binh Xuyen gained exclusive rights to a ter-
ritory in Saigon’s Chinese district of Cholon and the direct control over the 
Saigon police force. By 1954 the organization was profiteering from prosti-
tution, black market, drugs, etc. While its military force was much smaller 
than those of Cao Dai or Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen’s ill-gained wealth proved to 
be an important asset during the struggle for power in the newly estab-
lished South Vietnam. 
 
The Republic of Vietnam’s founding myth:  
struggle against the Sects 
 
As it was mentioned in the introduction, the role of religion was quite 
important from the very beginning of South Vietnam’s existence. The Catholic 
minority in Vietnam was mostly anticommunist, while at the same time 
being concentrated in the northern part of the country which, as agreed in 
Geneva Accords of 21st July 1954, was supposed to be under Communist 
rule. As a result, the South Vietnamese authorities, assisted by the French, 
the British, and the Americans, launched a massive relocation effort com-
bined with an intense propaganda campaign to move all willing people from 




the North to the South during the 300-day grace period that was guaran-
teed in Geneva. 
In operation Passage to Freedom that took place between 1954–1955, 
almost one million people moved from North to South Vietnam. Around six 
hundred thousand of those were Catholics, convinced to evacuate by their 
own priests, their own thoughts about the prospect of communist repres-
sion, or propaganda aimed at them by the Americans and South Vietnamese 
authorities, with pamphlets with slogans such as “the Virgin Mary has de-
parted from the North” or “Christ has gone south.”3 
In the South, Catholics became a much desired political base for prime 
minister Ngo Dinh Diem. South Vietnam’s leader came from a quite extra-
ordinary family with long traditions of serving the state, and at the same 
time devout Christians, tracing their conversion to Catholicism way back to 
the 17th century. Diem was a son of the mentioned earlier respected man-
darin Ngo Dinh Kha. As a young man, the future leader of South Vietnam 
contemplated becoming a man of the cloth, however in the end he decided 
to devote himself to serving his country. However, for his whole life Diem 
remained an austere and devout man, and never renounced his vows of 
chastity. He had five brothers, of whom four became civil servants like 
Diem, and the fifth, Ngo Dinh Thuc, became the third Vietnamese priest 
ever raised to the rank of bishop, and later became the first Vietnamese 
archbishop of Hue and the head of the Catholic Church in South Vietnam. 
However, in the immediate aftermath of the Geneva Conference in 1954, 
the solid political base of Catholics was still a long way off. The reality faced 
by Ngo Dinh Diem in June/July 1954 was a country devastated by years of 
partisan warfare, a fragmented and divided political scene, still consider-
able influence of the French, and hostile politico-religious organizations in 
form of Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen.4 The latter were hostile to Diem, 
although not openly in the first few months. Sects hoped to take part in 
sharing a piece of the political pie of the government of South Vietnam, 
driven both by their ambitions to rule the country, and by the desire to 
protect their own, semi-autonomous territories from any direct govern-
ment control. In addition, they were supported politically and financially by 
                                                 
3 Both the propaganda efforts and the logistical operation behind the population move-
ment are described in detail in book: R. Frankum, Operation Passage to Freedom: The United 
States Navy in Vietnam, 1954–55, Lubbock 2007, p. 260. 
4 As it was mentioned before, Binh Xuyen was in fact a crime organization, but since 
political ambitions and actions tied it closely to Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, the terms “politico-   
-religious organizations” and “Sects” in this article also refer to Binh Xuyen. 





the French, who saw them as their agents of influence in the former colony, 
and openly despised the Vietnamese prime minister (it was a mutual feeling). 
Sect leaders tried to convince the Americans throughout the whole summer 
of 1954 that Diem was isolated and should be replaced – because he lacked 
political support, but also because he was a Catholic, which Sects claimed 
was a huge drawback in the South. 
September 1954 was marked by the open eruption of the conflict between 
Ngo Dinh Diem and the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese National Army, Ge-
neral Nguyen Van Hinh. Hinh was a pro-French officer with huge political 
ambitions, and saw himself as a savior of the country. During August 1954 
he tried to convince the USA to topple Diem’s government and set up new 
regime that would include representatives of the Sects with him, or his 
father, as the prime minister.5 Hinh was supported, both covertly and 
openly, by the Sects leaders and the French, who lobbied for him both in 
Saigon and Washington. Aware of his formal subordinate’s machinations, 
Diem ordered the General to leave the country, under the guise of six months 
of military training in France, thus allowing him to save face. However, Hinh 
rejected the order, first ostentatiously riding around Saigon with Diem’s 
order displayed on his motorcycle, and then barricading himself in his villa 
protected by his troops, openly defying the prime minister’s decision.6 
In the end, Diem prevailed, thanks to the US support. Americans viewed 
the Sects as anachronistic and dangerous forces threatening the stability of 
the young Vietnamese state, and the State Department disagreed that any 
better candidate than Diem could be found. Washington also feared that if 
the General Hinh won this power struggle, it would have set a dangerous 
precedent about military-civilian relations in the new country.7 American 
assistance allowed the Vietnamese prime minister to bribe some Sect lead-
ers to support his government, and after Hinh started to hint that he will try 
to gain power by military coup in October, the United States intervened 
directly, threatening to cut all financial and military support to the Viet-
namese National Army.8 On November 8th, General Hinh boarded a French 
plane and left Indochina. 
                                                 
5 Nguyen Van Hinh was a son of former Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Van Tam, 
who was again favored for this position by the French. It is worth noting, that many (if 
not most) of South Vietnamese coups were in fact family ventures. 
6 M. Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, The Vietnam War 1954–1965, Cambridge 2006, p. 43. 
7 The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State, 16 September 1954, 
[in:] FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. XIII, part 2, pp. 2030–2031. 
8 Memorandum of Discussion at the 218th Meeting of the National Security Council, Fri-
day, October 22, 1954, 22 October 1954, [in:] FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. XIII, part 2, pp. 2153–
2159. 




However, the Sects remained, and after the French’ favorite for ousting 
Diem was forced into exile, Paris envoys in Saigon diverted most of their 
attention and efforts into brining Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen into an 
open conflict with government. According to the plan of General Paul Ély, 
Commissioner-General of Indochina, Ngo Dinh Diem’s cabinet, lacking the 
trust of the Vietnamese National Army or any wider popular support, would 
fall after direct challenge from the Sects, or at least be forced to include pro-
French politicians, bringing the country back under French control, even if 
from the backseat. 
One more factor was helping the French: in November 1954, a new Ameri-
can representative arrived in Vietnam. An experienced diplomat Donald 
R. Heath left Saigon, and General Joseph Lawton Collins arrived to take his 
place. Washington made this choice to strengthen the American position in 
dealing with the French, since Collins was not only a military officer, like 
Ély, but also a war hero from WW2, who took part in the liberation of Paris. 
However, the choice proved to be a flawed one. The new ambassador ar-
rived directly from his earlier post of the U.S. Representative in NATO, and 
with political naivety treated his French partners as sincere and well-
wishing allies, not understanding the serious differences between the po-
litical goals of the Americans and the French in Vietnam. While Washington 
sought to stabilize Diem’s regime and broaden its support, Paris wanted the 
Vietnamese prime minister gone in any way possible. To the dismay of lo-
wer-ranking Americans in Saigon, Collins quickly adopted the French nar-
ration that Diem has to go, repeating the arguments of French officers – 
from his perspective sincere friends and allies, simply more knowledgeable 
about the internal situation of South Vietnam – in his diplomatic cables to 
Washington.9 
By the end of January 1955, the French announced that they will stop 
paying their usual stipend for armed militias of politico-religious organiza-
tions. The Sects reacted exactly as the Commissioner-General expected: 
leaders of Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen turned to Diem, demanding 
incorporation of their units into Vietnamese National Army and covering 
their pay by the government. At the same time, Sect soldiers were supposed 
to remain in the politico-religious organizations territories and under their 
autonomous command. However, the Vietnamese prime minister managed 
to use this potential threat to his advantage. Using state funding as a bait, he 
                                                 
9 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Philippine and 
Southeast Asian Affairs (Young), 7 December 1954, [in:] FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. XIII, part 2, 
pp. 2350–2352. 





pulled several of the Sects generals to the government side, weakening the 
politico-religious organizations’ position, and at the same time strengthening 
his own.10 
However, this forced the Sects into action, and with the beginning of 
March 1955 they begun their counterattack. The leadership of Binh Xuyen, 
Cao Dai and Hoa Hao held a press conference, and Cao Dai’s pope, Pham 
Cong Tac, publicly announced the formation of the United Front of the 
Nationalist Forces. Diem was accused of dictatorship and of being a threat 
to the nationalistic cause of fighting Communists, and the Sects urged the 
formation of a new, broad nationalistic government.11 
Diem underestimated the threat presented by the United Front, and 
decided to ignore it completely, convinced that the lure of government fund-
ing would quickly erode the unity of the money-deprived Sects. However, 
on March 21st, the United Front announced its ultimatum, demanding 
Diem’s resignation, which was also signed by the generals that were on the 
government payroll. This was a disaster for Vietnamese prime minister. 
Not only military forces at his disposal did suddenly drastically decrease, 
swaying the balance of power in Saigon; the Generals’ betrayal also put new 
energy into French diplomatic efforts to present him as a weak and divisive 
politician. The sudden shift baffled and frustrated Americans, even the pro-
French Collins, who remarked that “discussing this problem with these 
generals was like trying to reason with two stubborn four year old children. 
They were either lying very ineptly or they are alarmingly stupid considering 
the influence and power they wield.”12 
The whole situation was moving in the direction of an open confron-
tation, which finally erupted during the night of 29/30th March, when Binh 
Xuyen militia attacked policemen loyal to Diem. However, after the initial 
assaults failed, and Diem’s troops were preparing to counterattack, French 
soldiers appeared on the streets of Saigon, separating the warring sides, 
ostensibly to protect civilians. But in the eyes of most observers, General 
                                                 
10 In the same month, Diem also refused to prolong Binh Xuyen’s gambling license, dras-
tically reducing the revenue of the organization. Telegram From the Special Representa-
tive in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State, 4 January 1955, [in:] FRUS, 1955–1957, 
vol. I, pp. 14–15; Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the De-
partment of State, 10 February 1955, [in:] FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. I, pp. 81–83. 
11 J. M. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance. Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s 
Southern Vietnam, Ithaca–London 2013, p. 91. 
12 Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of 
State, 23 March 1955, [in:] FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. I, pp. 142–143. 




Ély has intervened only to protect the Sects from the government retalia-
tion.13 
To Collins, the eruption of fighting was an additional proof that Diem has 
lost his ability to control the situation in South Vietnam. Despite the protests 
from lower-ranking diplomats and officers, the American General started to 
collaborate with the French Commissioner-General in devising a plot to 
replace Diem and bring the politico-religious organizations into the reformed 
government. 
In the second half of April, Collins flew to Washington, to personally 
convince American leaders about the need to get rid of the Vietnamese 
prime minister. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and president Eisen-
hower were skeptical: they saw reports from Saigon that were completely 
contradictory to what Collins had said, and their opinion of the French 
constant meddling in Indochina and the Sects was definitely unfavorable. 
However, they decided to trust the opinion of the man they had sent to Viet-
nam, and gave a green light for the Collins-Ély plan of disposing of Diem.14 
But the Vietnamese prime minister had no intention of waiting for his 
doom with folded hands. The sympathetic Americans warned him about the 
purpose of Collins’ Washington trip, and he sprang into action. On 28th April, 
Saigon erupted with clashes between Vietnamese National Army soldiers 
and Binh Xuyen militia.15 In Washington, the start of the conflict was greeted 
with interest and expectations that finally, the murky situation in Vietnam 
would become clear. As Secretary Dulles said, “The developments of last 
night could either lead to Diem’s utter overthrow or to his emergence from 
the disorder as a major hero.”16 One way or another, Americans would 
finally know who emerged successful. Despite Collins’ misgivings, the plan 
to replace Diem was put on hold. 
In Saigon, the battle quite quickly shifted in the government’s favor. 
Contrary to the pessimistic predictions of Collins and the French, the troops 
of the VAN proved both loyal to Diem and able to fight. In addition, the 
prime minister managed to secure the support from key Cao Dai and Hoa 
                                                 
13 M. Moyar, op. cit., p. 47. 
14 Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the 
Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, April 11, 1955, 11:13 a.m., [in:] FRUS, 
1955–1957, vol. I, p. 235; Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 
27 April 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. I, pp. 297–298. 
15 Officially Binh Xuyen troops started the fighting, but most probably they were pro-
voked by government forces. M. Moyar, op. cit., p. 50. 
16 Memorandum of Discussion at the 246th Meeting of the National Security Council, 
Washington, April 28, 1955, 28 April 1955, [in:] FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. I, pp. 307–312. 





Hao Generals once again, thus isolating Binh Xuyen in Saigon, and quickly 
pushing them into their Cholon district headquarters. In a few days most of 
the demoralized defenders defected to the government side or laid down 
arms, and only a small number of survivors fled into the swamps surround-
ing capital. Vietnam had a new hero, just like Dulles has predicted. 
With renewed American support17 and the French finally pushed to the 
side, Diem decided to quell the Sects once and for all. After giving his 
soldiers a few weeks of respite, the prime minister sent VNA troops against 
Hoa Hao warlords, who plotted with the exiled General Hinh. Right before 
the start of the operation, one of the four generals went over to the govern-
ment’s side with all of his men. Two other soon followed, and pleaded for 
the government’s mercy. Ba Cut, the only one remaining, was an old politi-
cal enemy of Ngo Dinh Diem and refused any kind of talks. However, he was 
betrayed in April 1956 by his subordinates for the substantial reward of-
fered by the government, and executed three months later. While conducting 
the operations against Hoa Hao warlords, the Vietnamese National Army 
did not forget about the remnants of Binh Xuyen, still present in the swamps 
near Saigon, and crushed them decisively in October 1955. At this point, 
Bay Vien was already living comfortably in France, with a large part of the 
organization’s wealth.18 
In the meantime, Ngo Dinh Diem’s supporters inside Cao Dai led to an 
internal coup in the organization, forcing pope Pham Cong Tac to flee to 
Cambodia in February 1956, where he lived until his death in year 1959. 
While the army was fighting and mopping up the military remnants of the 
Sects, government administration moved into their former territories, end-
ing their quasi-independence. 
While the fight with the Sects was still going on, Diem finalized his 
seizure of power in Vietnam, organizing a state referendum that took place 
on October 23rd, 1955. While marred by electoral fraud, the referendum 
was a resounding organizational success, and confirmed the prime minister’s 
grip on power. Three days after the voting took place, Ngo Dinh Diem pro-
claimed the creation of the Republic of Vietnam, with him as its president. 
The struggle against the Sects became an important part of the new state 
founding story. 
                                                 
17 On May 13th, Secretary Dulles wrote to his subordinates in the Department of State: 
“You will continue to give complete, loyal and sincere support to the present govern-
ment of Diem and you should deal with it as the independent and sovereign government 
which we believe it is and should be”. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Depart-
ment of State, 13 May 1955, [in:] FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. I, pp. 406–408. 
18 J. M. Chapman, op. cit., p. 126. 




Religion mixed with politics:  
Buddhist Crisis and fall of Ngo Dinh Diem 
 
On the evening of November 2nd 1963, Ngo Dinh Diem, the first president 
of the Republic of Vietnam, was murdered along with his brother in a military 
coup sponsored and encouraged by the United States Embassy in Saigon. 
However, most historians describing his downfall point to the Buddhist 
Crisis from the May 1963 as a real reason behind Diem’s demise. 
The most common narrative of those events goes as follows: Diem, who 
at that point was a simple dictator, was also a fanatical Roman Catholic, 
favoring his co-believers and persecuting the Buddhist majority of the coun-
try. In addition, his administration was riddled with nepotism and corruption. 
The conflict with the Buddhists erupted when Diem prohibited the display 
of religious flags on Vesak, a holiday celebrating the birth of Gautama Buddha 
in the city of Hue, just days after Vatican flags were displayed throughout 
the city on the occasion of Diem’s older brother Ngo Dinh Thuc’s 25th anni-
versary as a bishop. Peaceful protests about these double standards ended 
in violence, when soldiers started shooting during the demonstration on 
May 8th 1963, killing several people. The protests escalated, and on June 
11th, bonze Thich Quang Duc self-immolated on a busy Saigon street, which 
was captured on a world-famous photo. This image, along with biased 
reporting by several American journalists, established the world-recognized 
narrative of evil dictator Diem oppressing good, peaceful Buddhists. This 
narration was only reinforced when the Vietnamese president ordered his 
Special Forces to raid Xa Loi Pagoda19 and many other places of worship in 
South Vietnam, occupied by protesters, on early morning of August 21st. 
First press reports claimed hundreds were killed and wounded, and despite 
this information quickly being proven untrue, it further poisoned Vietnamese- 
-American relations. When Diem was killed in November, the Buddhists 
celebrated, and the US and global public opinion deemed this as the just end 
of the corrupt, brutal dictator. 
However, more recent works about the topic prove that the true picture 
of the Buddhist Crisis was more complicated. Not only was Ngo Dinh Diem 
not a violent oppressor of the Buddhist majority, the government coexisted 
with followers of Buddha surprisingly well until 1963. It is enough to say 
that the Xa Loi Pagoda was funded by Diem’s administration in 1956, along 
with tens of other temples across the country, sponsored by the state. Ed-
ward Miller argues that Vietnamese Buddhists saw their religion insepara-
                                                 
19 The largest pagoda in Saigon and Buddhist center in the city. 





bly connected with the fate of their nation and had their nationalistic vision 
of their own, making them political rivals to Diem, and this was the real 
reason for the 1963 confrontation. In other words, the American belief of    
a religious cause of the conflict is wrong, and in reality it was a clash of two 
competing visions of Vietnam.20 
Also, the ban on public display of religious flags, which provoked the 
demonstrations in Hue, was in fact the example of president’s Diem putting 
the national interest above religion – furious that his bishop-brother’s osten-
tatious display of Vatican’s flags could provoke the Buddhist majority of 
Hue’s populace, Diem introduced the ban to prevent such events in the future. 
However, correct in the concept, the new law was poorly timed and gave 
previously mentioned impression of being aimed solely at Buddhists, while 
it was the other way round. 
The Buddhist challenge had a religious aspect, but was in fact a political 
ploy for power, just like that of politico-religious organizations years earlier. 
Protesters very quickly turned from their purely religious demands into 
political ones: first against Buddhist discrimination, then against the Ngo 
Family, and finally, despite Diem’s concessions,21 they clearly articulated 
that their ultimate goal was to force the president to step down. Diem re-
acted to this challenge exactly like in year 1955: with confrontation. And 
just like during the Sect Crisis, the forceful solution proved effective. After 
Xa Loi Pagoda raids the backbone of the protesters movement had been 
broken and Diem re-affirmed his grip on power, and while the whole dispute 
was far from over, the streets of South Vietnam became much calmer. 
It is also worth noting that the president had support of his military in 
the struggle against the Buddhists. Despite their post-coup claims that they 
were tricked and set up by Diem and his brother Nhu and that the pagoda 
raids were performed exclusively by Special Forces and not the Army, in 
August 1963 Vietnamese Generals pressured Diem to deal forcefully with 
protesters, reminding him about the similarities with the 1955 crisis, and in 
fact they helped to plan the raids.22 They turned against the president only 
after they saw the negative reaction of the United States to the pagoda 
raids, which was completely different from the time of the Sect Crisis. This 
                                                 
20 E. Miller, op. cit., pp. 248–278. 
21 M. Moyar, op. cit., p. 228. 
22 Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency, 24 
August 1963, [in:] FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. III, pp. 614–620; Telegram From the Central 
Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency, 10 September 1963, [in:] FRUS, 1961–
1963, vol. IV, pp. 146–148. 




in turn was caused by biased reporting of several American journalists who 
were sympathizing with protesters and were hostile against Ngo Dinh Diem.23 
For example, all of their articles omitted the fact that the raided pagodas 
were stocked with supplies and small firearms, and that some leaders of the 
protest movement had ties to North Vietnam, dismissing any suggestion of 
Communist involvement as government propaganda. 
In reality, the leader of the movement, bonze Thich Tri Quang, preached 
that Communism and Buddhism could coexist, and his brother was an influ-
ential party member in North Vietnam, responsible for the infiltration of the 
South.24 It is worth noting that the question of communist infiltration of the 
Buddhist movement as something that definitely took place is raised today 
by the South Vietnamese Diaspora in United States.25 
Beside biased reporting, another reason why the American public opin-
ion generally supported the protesters was their idealized vision of Bud-
dhism as a gentle, peaceful religion of self-enlightenment and wise monks 
studying ancient knowledge. In reality Buddhism is as fractured and violent 
as all other great religions like Christianity or Islam.26 This was evident 
even during the crisis in Vietnam when the before mentioned bonze Thich 
Tri Quang declared, that “his intention [is] not to cease agitation until the 
Diem government falls. Thich Tri Quang also has indicated his intention,      
if necessary, to call for suicide volunteers.”27 
There is also a controversy about the size of the Buddhist religious ma-
jority in South Vietnam. While some authors gave number as high as 90% of 
the population, others argue that most of this number is made up by practi-
tioners of Vietnamese folk religion, easily mistaken by Westerners for Bud-
                                                 
23 This bias is confirmed by the personnel of American Embassy in Saigon, who them-
selves were not exactly the biggest fans of Ngo Dinh Diem at this period. Telegram From 
the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 7 July 1963, [in:] FRUS, 1961–1963 vol. III, 
pp. 470–471. 
24 M. Moyar, op. cit., pp. 217–218. 
25 Michael Do, the President of Vietnamese American Community of the USA, had no 
doubts about communist infiltration and control over Buddhist and peace movement in 
South Vietnam during sixties. M. Do, The Peace Movement in South Vietnam in Mid-1960s, 
paper presented at 1967: The Search for Peace Conference, Lubbock 28–29 April 2017. 
26 When in 2nd century BC one of Sri Lanka Buddhist kings defeated and slaughtered 
his non-Buddhist opponents, and was troubled by the extensive bloodshed, monks con-
soled him that the slain “were like animals; you will make the Buddha’s faith shine”. A. 
Strathern, Why Are Buddhist Monks Attacking Muslims?, [online] http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/magazine-22356306, [accessed: 29.06.2017]. 
27 Central Intelligence Agency Information Report, 8 July 1963, [in:] FRUS, 1961–1963, 
vol. III, p. 473–478. 





dhism, and followers of Buddha never made up more than 20% of popula-
tion, and that the a large part of Vietnamese Buddhists were actually very 
lax about their religion.28 
Another thing that is easily forgotten in the classic narration of the Bud-
dhist Crisis is the fact that self-immolation has a slightly different role in 
Southeast Asia. It was not a shocking act of utter desperation, like it was 
presented by the American journalists, but while indeed being a form of 
political protest, it had a long tradition as a religious practice in Buddhism, 
both as a sacrifice and a way of reaching enlightenment. 
While the Vietnamese president was indeed a Roman Catholic, and he 
favored other Catholics on government and military positions, it wasn’t actu-
ally the case of religious favoritism or discrimination. The key to under-
standing the South Vietnam of that time was loyalty. One of the main Amer-
ican charges against Diem was his nepotism and favoritism in filling state 
posts. The Vietnamese president favored people that were loyal to him, 
even if they were incompetent or corrupt. However, it was a matter of 
simple survival: in a country lacking democratic traditions but full of ambitious 
pretenders, filling important positions with your supporters was essential. 
And since most Catholics in the South Vietnam came from the North during 
the transition period after the Geneva Conference of 1954, in general they 
were more anti-Communist, more loyal to the government, and more effective 
as civil workers. In other words, being a Catholic was seen as a merit, but 
actually because of all other reasons than the religion itself. 
In a widely circulated anecdote, Diem once told one of his Generals, sup-
posedly forgetting that he was a Buddhist, “Put your Catholic officers in 
sensitive places. They can be trusted.”29 It is highly doubtful that Diem would 
have “forgotten” that one of his close subordinates is Buddhist. Besides,      
in that situation he was stating the truth, not a religious bias. As already 
mentioned, Catholics in fact tended to be more loyal and reliable. It was not 
a slip of the tongue from the Vietnamese president, as the General was al-
ready a member of Diem’s inner circle, and his faith was irrelevant at this 
point. The key was loyalty to the head of state. It is also worth noting that in 
the period when Americans were most vocal about the Ngo family’s nepo-
tism, United States were ruled by a president from an influent political 
family who chose his younger brother to the position of his Attorney General. 
                                                 
28 M. Do, op. cit. 
29 M. E. Gettleman, Vietnam: History, Documents and Opinions on a Major World Crisis, 
Harmondsworth–Middlesex 1966, pp. 280–282. 




After Diem’s demise, Buddhists became one of the main political players 
in South Vietnam. This however proved fatal: the lack of Ngo Dinh Diem and 
the dismantling of his administration plunged the country into the state of 
perpetual chaos. After another coup deposed the Buddhists favorite, General 
Duong Van Minh, from power, monk-led protests returned to the streets of 




Religion played an important part both during birth and later years of South 
Vietnam’s existence. Most of the time it was only a pretext and cover for 
political ambition, but the emotions it caused were definitely real. Even if 
leaders of Sects or Buddhist movement fought for their vision of the state, 
or their place in country’s power structure, their followers treated the question 
of religion very seriously. It is worth to note that Cao Dai and Hoa Hao 
survived both the crushing of their political ambitions by Ngo Dinh Diem 
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